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Saving an Old Friend From Extinction:
A Proposal to Amend Rather Than




this Essay critically assesses a pending, proposed amendment to the Federal Rules
of Evidence-slated to take effect in December 2017-that would abrogate Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(16), the hearsay exception for ancient documents. the proposed
amendment was motivated largely by a fear that large quantities of potentially unreliable,
stockpiled, electronically stored information (ESI) are approaching the threshold age
for being deemed "ancient" and could thus be swept into evidence via the exception.
In Part I of this Essay, I provide an overview of the proposed amendment. In Part
II, I contend that although the proposal is a well-intentioned effort to deal with a
potential problem, abrogating rather than amending the hearsay exception is unduly
strong medicine. I argue that in proposing abrogation, the drafters of the proposed
amendment have overstated the risks associated with Rule 803(16) and understated its
utility, and that such a move would put the Federal Rules of Evidence out of sync with
those of all but one of the fifty states. Finally, in Part 111, 1 propose a set of amendments
that would remedy what the drafters of the proposed amendment identified as Rule
803(16)'s deficiencies, while at the same time allowing its continued use in those rare
cases where it may serve as the only gateway to admitting evidence necessary to prove
ancient wrongs deserving of vindication.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay-defined as a person's oral or
written assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion, offered into evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein-is inadmissible unless it
falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.' Among the dozens of such excep-
tions is one set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16) for statements contained
in so-called ancient documents, defined as those "at least 20 years old and whose
authenticity is established."3 In turn, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(8) sets
forth a method for authenticating such documents, providing that they must be in
a condition that creates no suspicion about their authenticity; be in a place where,
if authentic, theywould likely be; and be at least twenty years old when offered.4
In April 2015, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules approved a
proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would abrogate
Rule 803(16) while leaving Rule 901(b)(8) intact.5 In August 2015, the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States published the proposed amendment for public comment.6 Thus,
under the proposal, meeting the criteria for an ancient document set forth in Rule
901(b)(8) would satisfy the authentication requirements of the Federal Rules of
Evidence but would be insufficient to overcome a hearsay objection. Unless the
Advisory Committee is persuaded by public comments to reconsider the
amendment, abrogation of the hearsay exception is set to take effect on Decem-
ber 1, 2017.'
In recommending abrogation of the hearsay exception for ancient docu-
ments, the Advisory Committee appeared to be primarily concerned with the
theoretical possibility that we are on the cusp of having the exception invoked to
sweep in large quantities of potentially unreliable, stockpiled, electronically stored
1. FED. R. EVID. 801(a), Qc.
2. FED. R. EVID. 802.
3. FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
4. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
5. ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA BOOK 13, 55-72 (Apr. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter AGENDA BooK2015].
6. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 17-20, 25-26 (Aug.
2015) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
7. Id. at 25.
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information (ESI).8 Because the exception defines ancient as twenty years, and
because much ESI is on the verge of reaching that threshold age, the Advisory
Committee believed that it was necessary to act with some immediacy.9
In Part I of this Essay, I provide an overview of the Advisory Committee's
proposal, including its rejection of possible amendments in lieu of abrogation.
In Part II, I conclude that although the Advisory Committee's proposal is a
well-intentioned effort to deal with a potential problem, abrogating rather than
amending the hearsay exception is unduly strong medicine, akin to using a
sledgehammer to kill a gnat. I demonstrate that in proposing abrogation, the
Advisory Committee has overstated the risks associated with Rule 803(16) and
understated its utility, and that such a move would put the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence out of sync with those of all but one of the fifty states. Finally, in Part III, I
propose a set of amendments-different from those considered and rejected by
the Advisory Committee--that would remedy what the Advisory Committee
identified as Rule 803(16)'s deficiencies.
I. THEADVISORY COMMITIEE'S PROPOSAL
The Advisory Committee first focused its attention on the potential prob-
lem of unreliable ESI being swept into evidence via Federal Rule of Evidence
803(16) at its April 2014 meeting, prompted by a memo drafted by Professor
Daniel J. Capra, the Advisory Committee's official reporter.1" At its October
2014 meeting, the Advisory Committee-concerned that the exception could be
invoked to sweep in archived web pages, personal emails, text messages, social
media postings, and the like-unanimously agreed that this rendered Rule
803(16) problematic.11 Yet, the Advisory Committee was split both on whether
to wait for such developments to occur or to act proactively, and on how to
amend the rule to remedy the problem. 12 Ultimately, the Advisory Committee
decided to act proactively and voted at its April 2015 meeting to abrogate the
hearsay exception.13
8. See id. at 18, 26.
9. See id.
10. See ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA BOOK 5, 101-13 (Apr. 4, 2014). In
addition to his official work as the Advisory Committee's reporter, Professor Capra has also
advocated for reforming Rule 803(16) to prevent the admission of unreliable ESI in his published
scholarship. See Daniel J. Capra, Electronically Stored Information and the Ancient Documents
Exception to the Hearsay Rule- Fix It Before People Find outAbout It, 17 YALE J.L. &TECH. 1 (2015).
11. See AGENDA BOOK 2015, supra note 5, at 21-23.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 13, 55-72; PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, at 17-20, 25-26.
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The Advisory Committee's decision to abrogate the hearsay exception was
bolstered by several considerations. First, the Advisory Committee questioned
the underlying rationale for the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule,
noting that a document does not magically become reliable by virtue of its age,
and that at best it has been justified on the ground of necessity, namely, the una-
vailability of other proof for old disputes.14 Second, the Advisory Committee
noted that the hearsay exception lacked a historical pedigree, contrasting the
longstanding common law practice of authenticating documents by demonstrat-
ing that they qualify as ancient documents with the relatively recent recognition
of a hearsay exception for ancient documents, with the hearsay exception origi-
nally applying only to property-related documents."5 Moreover, the Advisory
Committee found it problematic that under Rule 803(16), documents may be
authenticated using any method, and not necessarily in accordance with the stric-
tures of Rule 901(b)(8). 16 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee concluded that
eliminating the exception would have a minimal impact on the exclusion of oth-
erwise reliable hearsay, noting that it is only seldom invoked and that in any event
other avenues to admissibility-in particular the hearsay exception for business
records (Rule 803(6)) and the residual hearsay exception (Rule 807)-would pave
the way to admitting reliable evidence that heretofore was admitted as an ancient
document. 17
Professor Capra's memo to the committee also raised two additional criti-
cisms of the ancient documents hearsay exception. First, he discussed its
sweeping nature: If an ancient document is authenticated, he wrote, "every
statement in that document can be admitted for its truth.""8 And second, he
disliked its arbitrary, brightline nature: A document that is nineteen years and
364 days old is inadmissible under the exception, but another document that is
one day older would be admissible.1 9
The Advisory Committee considered and rejected three alternatives to ab-
rogation of the hearsay exception: limiting the exception to hardcopy documents;
adding a requirement-akin to that found in Rule 803(6)-that the document
would be excluded if the opponent could show a lack of trustworthiness; or add-
ing a requirement-akin to that found in the residual exception-that it could be
14. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, at 18, 25-26.
15. Id. at 18.
16. See AGENDA BOOK 2015, supra note 5, at 58.
17. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, at 18, 26; AGENDA BOOK 2015, supra note 5, at 60.
18. AGENDA BOOK 2015, supra note 5, at 58 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 60.
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invoked only as a last resort when necessary.2" The Advisory Committee rejected
the first alternative both on the ground that there would be definitional ambigui-
ties in some instances when distinguishing hardcopy from ESI and that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence generally eschew drawing such a distinction, and it rejected
the latter two alternatives on the ground that they would make the exception
much more akin to the residual exception, raising questions about why it should
exist as a freestanding hearsay exception.21
II. CRITIQUE OFTHEADVISORY COMmITTEE'S PROPOSAL TO
ABROGATE RULE 803(16)
The Advisory Committee is surely correct that the ancient documents hear-
say exception has only been infrequently invoked in reported cases, and thus that
the impact of its abrogation would not be widespread. Rule 803(16)'s focused
impact, however, should not diminish the fact that abrogation may make it diffi-
cult for litigants successfully to obtain redress for egregious past harms.
The ancient documents exception has been most frequently invoked in the
federal courts in proceedings related to Nazi-era wrongdoing, including pro-
ceedings to revoke U.S. citizenship or to repatriate stolen property.22 The ex-
ception has also been invoked in at least one case involving child sexual abuse in
the Catholic Church.23 Moreover, in at least some of these cases, it seems
doubtful that the evidence would have been admissible under another codified
hearsay exception such as the business records exception.24 Although it is true,
20. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, at 18. One state--Maryland-includes a trustworthiness
proviso in its analogue to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16). MD. R 5-803(16).
21. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, at 19.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kalymon, 541 F.3d 624, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951,
966 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 443-44 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Stelmokas,
100 F.3d 302, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Tittjung, 948 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 253-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Szehinskyj, 104 F. Supp. 2d 480,
488-92 (E.D. Pa. 2000); United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31, 38 (D. Mass. 1996).
23. See In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 11-20059-svk, 2015 WL 1396628, at *6-7 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 24, 2015).
24. See, e.g., Kalymon, 541 F.3d at 632-33 (document at issue a purely personal document that bears
none of the hallmarks of a business record); Firishchak, 468 F.3d at 1022 (noting defendant's
argument that documents at issue would not be admissible as business records because they do not
satisfy that exception's "in the ordinary course" requirement); Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at
253-56 (documents at issue purely personal documents that bear none of the hallmarks of business
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as the Advisory Committee indicated, that the residual hearsay exception could
serve as a safety valve post-abrogation for admitting reliable non-ESI documents
that would have been admissible under the ancient documents exception, the
vague contours of that exception create an unduly high degree of litigation uncer-
tainty.2" In addition, relying on the residual hearsay exception as a means of ad-
miting into evidence a specific and established category of hearsay evidence such
as ancient documents seems inconsistent with the design and purpose of the re-
sidual hearsay exception, which is to deal with "new and presently unanticipated
situations."26 Thus, abrogating the exception would not be without some cost in
some very sympathetic cases in which the age of the offenses makes proof by oth-
er means difficult, and this real cost needs to be balanced against the theoretical
problem of admitting large quantities of unreliable ESI.
Moreover, Professor Capra's memos to the Advisory Committee somewhat
overstate the potentially sweeping scope of the ancient documents hearsay excep-
tion so far as any evidence, ESI or otherwise, is concerned. As indicated above,
Professor Capra wrote that if an ancient document is authenticated, "every state-
ment in that document can be admitted for its truth."' 27 Among the examples he
has identified are every outrageous statement ever published in the National En-
quirer in either print or electronic form-such as an article attributing an assertion
to Hillary Clinton that she "shared Monica with Bill" as well as the rantings of a
psychotic person in a personal diary.2"
Yet two other evidentiary principles, common across all hearsay exceptions
and specifically held by courts and commentators to be applicable to the ancient
documents hearsay exception, guard against such a potentially broad sweep. First,
as with all other hearsay exceptions, the ancient documents exception is only ap-
plicable if the dedarant spoke from personal knowledge as required by Federal
Rule of Evidence 602.29 Thus, if it does not appear from the statement itself that
records); In re Archdiocese of Miwaukee, 2015 WL 1396628, at *6-7 (document at issue would not
satisfy business record exception, even if the letter was treated as part of the church's business records,
since the document was written by someone not employed by the church but rather an outsider).
25. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807; see also James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Revisited, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787, 794-802 (1993).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 807 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (transferred from FED. R. EVID.
803(24)).
27. AGENDA BOOK2015, supra note 5, at 58 (emphasis in original).
28. ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, AGENDA BOOK, 78-79, 89 (Oct. 24, 2014)
[hereinafter AGENDA BOOK2014]. See also Capra, supra note 10, at 2-3.
29. See FED. R. EVID. 803 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules ("In a hearsay situation,
the dedarant is, of course, a witness, and neither this rle nor Rule 804 dispenses with the
requirement of firsthand knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be inferable from
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the author of the document was recounting her own firsthand observations, the
document would be excluded on the ground that the declarant lacked personal
knowledge."0 And second, despite some precedent to the contrary so far as the an-
cient documents hearsay exception is concerned,31 the overwhelming majority
view is that the exception-like nearly all other hearsay exceptions-does not en-
compass hearsay within hearsay.32 Rather, if an ancient document recounts a
statement that the author heard another person make, the statement contained in
the ancient document but attributable to the other person would be admissible on-
ly if it fell within a separate exception to the hearsay rule.33 Thus, in most jurisdic-
tions, a National Enquirer story containing a statement by an unnamed source
that Hillary Clinton said something would be hearsay within hearsay within hear-
say, and thus would not be admitted into evidence based on the ancient docu-
ments exception alone.34
Finally, abrogation would put the Federal Rules of Evidence out of sync with
their state law counterparts. Although there is some variation amongst the states,
forty-nine of the fifty states recognize a hearsay exception for ancient documents
circumstances. See Rule 602."); Columbia First Bank, FSB v. United States, 58 Fed. CL 333, 337-
38 (Fed. CL 2003); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Communications, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, 2014 WL
4829173, at *7 (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 29, 2014); Howard Hughes Medical Inst. v. Neff, 640 S.W.2d
942, 948-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Sherrill v. Plum-dey's Estate, 514 S.W2d 286, 290-91 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1974); 5 JOHN HENRY WGMORE, WGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1573 n.a (3d ed. 1940); 5
JACK B. WEINSTEIN &MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.18,
at 803-128 (Mark S. Brodin ed., 2d ed. 2015).
30. In the case of someone who has a mental impairment that prevents her from properly perceiving
things-such as the psychotic author of a diary-courts have held that such a fimding would
demonstrate a lack of personal knowledge that would call for the exclusion of such evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1989); Behler v. Hanlon, 199 FRD. 553,
558 n.8 (D. Md. 2001).
31. See Langbord v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. CIV.A.06-5315, 2011 WL 2623315, at *16-17
(E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011).
32. See United States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1998); Columbia First Bank, 58 Fed. Cl. at
338; Northern States Power Co. v. City of Ashland, Wis., No. 12-cv-602-bbc, 2015 WL 1745880,
at *9 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 16,2015); Ultratec, 2014 WL 4829173, at *7; State Financial Bankv. City of
South Milwaukee, No. 00-C-1530, 2006 WL 2691604, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2006); Ruth v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 615 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 n2 (N.D. Ohio 2005); Hicks v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 799,806-07 (E.D. Tex. 2005); United States v. Stelmokas, 1995 WL 464264,
at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2,1995); People v. McCullough, No. 2-12-1364,2015 WL 630462, at *22-
23 (Il. App. Feb. 11, 2015); Rehm v. Ford Motor Co., 365 S.W.3d 570,581-83 (Ky. App. 2011).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 805.
34. Professor Capra's reference to such sensational examples in advocating for abrogation of Rule
803(16) is surprising given his acknowledgement that the ancient documents exception should not
be interpreted to encompass hearsay within hearsay. See AGENDA BOOK 2014, supra note 28, at 77;
Capra, supra note 10, at 9 n.32.
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in some form.3" Only the Kansas evidence code has in place what the proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence would embrace: a means to au-
thenticate a document by showing that it qualifies as an ancient document,36 but
without a corresponding hearsay exception.37 Given that the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply even when state law claims are litigated in federal court,3" creat-
ing such a widespread rift between federal and state evidence law by abrogating
Rule 803(16) creates an undesirable potential forum shopping opportunity in di-
versity cases.3"
III. ALTERNATIVES TO ABROGATION
Despite my criticisms of the Advisory Committee's proposal to abrogate
Rule 803(16), it has nonetheless raised some important questions regarding the
35. See ALA. R. EVID. 803(16); ALASKA R. EVID. 803(16); ARIZ. R. EVID. 803(16); ARK. R. EVID.
803(16); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1331 (West 2015); COLO. R. EVID. 803(16); CONN. CODE EVID.
§ 8-3(9); DEL. R. EVID. 803(16); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(16) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-
803(16) (2013); HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(16); IDAHO R. EVID. 803(16); ILL. R. EVID. 803(16);
IND. R. EVID. 803(16); IOWA R. EVID. 5-803(16); KY. R. EVID. 803(16); LA. R. EVID. 803(16);
ME. R. EVID. 803(16); MD. R. 5-803(16); MICH. R. EVID. 803(16); MINN. R. EVID. 803(16);
MISS. R. EVID. 803(16); MONT. R. EVID. 803(16); NEB. R. EVID. 803(15); NEV. REV. STAT. §
51.235 (2013); N.C. R. EVID. 803(16); N.D. R. EVID. 803(16); N.H. R. EVID. 803(16); NJ. R.
EVID. 803(c)(16); N.M. R. EVID. 11-803(16); OHIO R. EVID. 803(16); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2803(16) (West 2011); OR. R. EVID. 803(16); PA. R. EVID. 803(16); R.I. R. EVID. 803(16); S.C.
R. EVID. 803(16); S.D. R. EVID. 19-19-803(16); TENN. R. EVID. 803(16); TEX. EVID. CODE
ANN. § 803(16) (West 2003); UTAH R. EVID. 803(16); VT. R. EVID. 803(16); VA. R. EVID.
2:803(16); WASH. R. EVID. 803(16); W.V. R. EVID. 803(16); WIS. STAT. § 908.03(16) (2014);
Wyo. R. EVID. 803(16); Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No.
CIV.A.WOCV2002-0982A, 2013 WL 6436948, at *6 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 30,2013); Tillman v.
Lincoln Warehouse Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 151,153 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Davis v. Wood, 61 S.W.
695,698 (Mo. 1901).
36. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-464 (2005).
37. 7 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 83:18 (15th ed. 2001).
38. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d
ed. 1996).
39. Consider a document critical in litigation between two parties that would be admissible as an
ancient document under a state law hearsay exception but that would no longer be admissible
in federal court after abrogation of Rule 803(16) and that would be admissible under no other
federal hearsay exception. If the document is favorable to the defendant, the plaintiff has an
incentive to forum shop: By opting to file the diversity action in federal rather than state
court, the plaintiff would benefit because the document could not be offered into evidence
against him. If instead, the document is favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant has an
incentive to forum shop: If the plaintiff files the diversity action in state court (in part to take
advantage of the document's admissibility under the state hearsay exception), the defendant
would benefit by removing the action to federal court, where the document would be
inadmissible.
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application and scope of the rule that merit attention. Yet I believe that the con-
cems raised can be remedied by amendments that fall well short of abrogation. I
thus propose four amendments to the rule-different from those considered and
rejected by the Advisory Committee-that could be adopted individually or in
tandem.
First, and at the very least, if the Advisory Committee is concerned with an
impending explosion of ESI that meets Rule 803(16)'s age threshold, one of the
simplest ways to remedy that problem-at least in the short term-is to increase
the threshold from twenty to thirty years. The selection of a thirty-year threshold
is not an arbitrary one: It would align Federal Rule 803(16) with the preexisting
common law threshold that had been in place since the mid-1700s4° that the fed-
eral rule sharply broke from.41 While this would put the federal rule slightly out
of sync with the majority of states-which have adopted the federal definition of
twenty years in their analogues to the ancient documents hearsay exception42-
this would be a difference of degree and not kind. Moreover, the federal rule as
amended would be aligned with the one-third of states that retained the common
law threshold of thirty years in their hearsay exceptions for ancient documents.43
Thus, even if the Advisory Committee is on the fence about whether to abrogate
or consider other amendments to Rule 803(16), reverting to the common law pe-
riod of thirty years could serve as a stopgap measure, allowing the Advisory
Committee another decade to consider the possible effects of and remedies for
40. See 7 JOHN HENRYWIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2138 (1978).
Prior to the mid-1700s, the common law threshold was forty years. Id.
41. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
42. See ALA. R. EVID. 803(16); ARiz. R. EVID. 803(16); ARK. R. EVID. 803(16); COLO. R. EVID.
803(16); DEL. R. EVID. 803(16); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(16); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(16)
(2013); HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(16); ILL. R. EVID. 803(16); KY. R. EVID. 803(16); ME. R. EVID.
803(16); MD. R. EVID. 5-803(16); MICH. R. EVID. 803(16); MINN. R. EVID. 803(16); MISS. R.
EVID. 803(16); MONT. R. EVID. 803(16); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.235 (2013); N.C. R. EVID.
803(16); N.D. R. EVID. 803(16); N.H. R. EVID. 803(16); N.M. R. EVID. 11-803(16); OHIO R.
EVID. 803(16); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803(16) (WEST 2011); OR. R. REV. RULE 803(16);
R.I. R. EVID. 803(16); S.C. R. EVID. 803(16); S.D. R. EVID. 19-19-803(16) (2015); TEX. EVID.
CODE ANN. § 803(16) (West 2003); UTAH R. EVID. 803(16); VT. R. EVID. 803(16); WASH. R.
EVID. 803(16); W.VA. R. EVID. 803(16); WIS. STAT. § 908.03(16) (2014); WYO. R. EVID.
803(16).
43. See ALA. R. EVID. 803(16); CONN. CODE EVID. § 8-3(9); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1331 (West 2015);
IDAHO R. EVID. 803(16); IND. R. EVID. 803(16); IOWA R. EVID. 5-803(16); LA. R. EVID.
803(16); NEB. R. EVID. 803(15); NJ. R. EVID. 803(c)(16); PA. R. EVID. 803(16); TENN. R. EVID.
803(16); VA. R. EVID. 2:803(16); Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WL
6436948, at *6 (Mass. 2013); Tillman v. Lincoln Warehouse Corp., 423 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979); Davis v. Wood, 61 S.W. 695, 698 (Mo. 1901). Kansas does not have a hearsay
exception for ancient documents, but its provision for authenticating ancient documents requires
that they be a minimum of thirty years old. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-464 (2005).
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aging ESI. Such a change would maintain rough synchronicity between the fed-
eral and state versions of the hearsay exception, and would not negatively impact
the utility of the exception in the many cases involving Nazi-era wrongdoings,
since all documentary evidence offered in such cases now well exceeds the com-
mon law threshold in age."
Second, the Advisory Committee should resolve the disconnect between
the ancient document hearsay exception set forth in Rule 803(16) and the an-
cient documents authentication provision set forth in Rule 901(b)(8). As indi-
cated above, Rule 901(b)(8) contains two prerequisites in addition to age to au-
authenticate a document as ancient: The document must be in a condition that
creates no suspicion about its authenticity, and it must be found in a place where,
if authentic, it would likely be.4" Yet as the Advisory Committee noted in its
proposal to abrogate the hearsay exception, the plain language of Rule 803(16)
does not require that the document be authenticated pursuant to the method set
forth in Rule 901(b)(8);46 it only refers to a document "whose authenticity is es-
tablished,"47 meaning that any method of authentication set forth in Federal
Rules 901 or 902 evidently would suffice.
It is not dear that this disconnect between the two rules was intentional.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(16), as well as those of numerous
states that modeled their evidence rules after Rule 803(16), seemed to assume
that the documents would be authenticated in accordance with Rule 901(b)(8).4"
Yet in accordance with the plain language of the text of the rule, numerous courts
have agreed that any method of authentication suffices to admit a document as
ancient under Rule 803(16). 49 In any event, this disconnect is problematic be-
cause the two additional prerequisites contained in Rule 901(b) (8) in conjunction
with age together are what bestow on ancient documents sufficient indicia of
44. The thirty-year threshold, like the twenty-year threshold, is a brightline nile subject to the same
criticisms raised by Professor Capra. The common law, however, experimented with a vague
standard of ancient without specfying a particular threshold age prior to the 1700s but moved
toward a brightline nile because the indefiniteness of the prior standard was found to be undesirable.
SeeWIGMORE, supra note 40.
45. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
46. AGENDA BOOK 2015, supra note 5 at 58.
47. FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
48. See FED. R. EVID. 803(16) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules; ALA. R. EVID.
803(16) Advisory Committee's Notes; HAW. R. EVlD. 803(b)(16) Commentary; MINN. R.
EVlD. 803(16) Committee Comments.
49. See, e.g., Milton H. Green Archives, Inc. v. BPI Communications, Inc., 320 Fed. Appe 572, 573
(9th Cir. 2009); Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 643 (2d Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Atlas Lederer Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 687, 697
(S.D. Ohio 2001).
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trustworthiness to justify admitting them into evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule."° Indeed, the ancient documents hearsay exception recognized at
common law included these three prerequisites as part of the definition of the
hearsay exception itself." Thus, by breaking with the common law and defining
ancient documents for hearsay purposes as "a document that is at least twenty
years old and whose authenticity is established," Federal Rule 803(16) allowed
mere age alone to suffice to admit something as an ancient document when the
common law required greater assurances of trustworthiness. This could be reme-
died either by adding the words "in accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b)(8)" at the end of Rule 803(16), or-similar to what one state has done--by
replacing the phrase "whose authenticity is established" with the phrase "if it is in a
condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity and it is found in a place
where, if authentic, it would likely be." 2
Third, although the overwhelming weight of precedent supports the con-
clusion that Rule 803(16) encompasses only the hearsay statement of the person
who wrote the ancient document and not hearsay statements of others recounted
therein, 3 because at least some precedent interprets the phrase "statement in a
document" contained in Rule 803(16) broadly to encompass any statement-
including layered hearsay 4-the Advisory Committee should take action to
make sure that future courts follow the majority interpretation. This could be ac-
complished by adding a sentence within Rule 803(16) that reads, "Hearsay
statements recounted within ancient documents are admissible only in accord-
ance with Federal Rule of Evidence 805," with the cross-referenced rule provid-
ing that "[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if
each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule."55
50. See Sherrill v. Plumley's Estate, 514 S.W.2d 286,290-91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); WEINSTEIN, supra
note 29, at 803-128 ("Additional assurances of reliability are provided by the requirements that the
document be in writing, have been produced from proper custody, and be unsuspicious in
condition.").
51. See, e.g., Zobel v. Slim, 576 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex. 1978); San Antonio River Auth. v. Hunt, 405
S.W.2d 700, 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Barrows v. Kenosha Cty., 98 N.W.2d 461,464-65 (Wis.
1959); Perry v. Parker, 141 A.2d 883, 884 (N.H. 1958); City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of
Spokane, 206 P.2d 277, 281 (Wash. 1949).
52. Cf CONN. CODE EVID. § 8-3(9) (induding the phrase "if it is produced from proper custody and
otherwise free from suspicion" in lieu of the phrase "whose authenticity is established" in the state
analogue to Rule 803(16)).
53. See supra note 32.
54. See supra note 31.
55. FED. R. EVID. 805.
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Finally, to the extent that the Advisory Committee finds any or all of the
above suggestions to be insufficient to assure itself of the reliability of evidence of-
fered pursuant to Rule 803(16), it could borrow two additional prerequisites from
state counterparts to Rule 803(16) and from other exceptions to the hearsay rule
that provide further assurances of trustworthiness. These include a requirement
that the document must have been produced before the controversy at issue
arose,5 6 as well as a requirement that the statements contained in the document
were subsequently acted upon as true by those having an interest in the matter set
forth therein. 7 The first additional requirement would provide assurances of reli-
ability by negating at least one motive to make untruthful statements in the docu-
ment, while the second requirement would provide circumstantial evidence of the
accuracy of the statements contained therein.
CONCLUSION
The Advisory Committee should be applauded for its efforts to update the
Federal Rules of Evidence to account for modern technological advances as well as
to make certain that the rules are not misused in ways that undermine the policies
that underlie them. The Advisory Committee's concern over the admissibility of
unreliable ESI has raised important questions about the scope and application of
the hearsay exception set forth in Rule 803(16) for ancient documents.
Yet rather than taking the drastic step of abrogating the exception, I propose
instead that the Advisory Committee consider adopting four amendments to the
rule. First, increase the age threshold for ancient documents from twenty to thirty
years. Second, explicitly incorporate the reliability criteria set forth in Rule
901(b)(8) for authenticating a document as ancient into the hearsay exception it-
self. Third, include an explicit proviso indicating that Rule 803(16) encompasses
only the hearsay statement of the person who wrote the ancient document and not
hearsay statements of others recounted therein. And finally, consider adding ad-
ditional prerequisites to admissibility, including a requirement that the document
have been produced before the controversy at issue arose and that the statements
contained in the document were subsequently acted upon as true by those having
an interest in the matter set forth therein.
The first of these proposed amendments would, at least in the short term,
dramatically reduce the quantity of ESI that would be potentially admissible as an-
56. See FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
57. See FED. R. EVID. 803(15); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1331 (West 2015); VA. R. EVID. 2:803(16).
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cient documents, and could serve as a stopgap measure while the Advisory Com-
mittee studied the matter in greater detail. The remaining three amendments,
adopted either individually or in tandem, should be more than sufficient to serve
as a long-term remedy for the hearsay exception's deficiencies, including but not
limited to circumstances in which ESI is involved. At the same time, amending
rather than abrogating the ancient documents hearsay exception will allow for its
continued use in those rare cases when it may serve as the only gateway to admit-
ting evidence necessary to prove ancient wrongs deserving of vindication.
